Decision Making and the Will of God Review

Psychological miracle that occurs inside a grouping of people

Groupthink is a psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome. Cohesiveness, or the desire for cohesiveness, in a group may produce a tendency among its members to hold at all costs.^[i] This causes the group to minimize conflict and achieve a consensus conclusion without critical evaluation.^[2] ^[iii]

Groupthink is a construct of social psychology, just has an all-encompassing achieve and influences literature in the fields of communication studies, political science, management, and organizational theory,^[4] likewise every bit important aspects of deviant religious cult behaviour.^[five] ^[six]

Overview [edit]

Groupthink is sometimes stated to occur (more broadly) within natural groups within the community, for case to explain the lifelong unlike mindsets of those with differing political views (such every bit "conservatism" and "liberalism" in the U.S. political context ^[7] or the purported benefits of team work vs. piece of work conducted in confinement).^[8] Notwithstanding, this conformity of viewpoints within a grouping does non mainly involve deliberate group decision-making, and might be better explained past the collective confirmation bias of the private members of the group.

The term was coined in 1952 by William H. Whyte Jr.^[9] Nearly of the initial research on groupthink was conducted by Irving Janis, a research psychologist from Yale University.^[ten] Janis published an influential volume in 1972, which was revised in 1982.^[11] ^[12] Janis used the Bay of Pigs disaster (the failed invasion of Castro's Cuba in 1961) and the Japanese assail on Pearl Harbor in 1941 as his two prime number instance studies. Later studies have evaluated and reformulated his groupthink model.^[thirteen] ^[fourteen]

Groupthink requires individuals to avoid raising controversial problems or alternative solutions, and at that place is loss of individual creativity, uniqueness and independent thinking. The dysfunctional group dynamics of the "ingroup" produces an "illusion of invulnerability" (an inflated certainty that the right decision has been made). Thus the "ingroup" significantly overrates its own abilities in decision-making and significantly underrates the abilities of its opponents (the "outgroup"). Furthermore, groupthink can produce dehumanizing actions against the "outgroup". Members of a grouping tin frequently feel under peer pressure to "proceed with the crowd" for fright of "rocking the boat" or of how their speaking out will be perceived by the rest of the grouping. Group interactions tend to favor articulate and harmonious agreements and it tin can be a cause for business concern when little to no new innovations or arguments for improve policies, outcomes and structures are called to question. (McLeod). Groupthink tin can oftentimes be referred to as a grouping of "aye men" because grouping activities and grouping projects in full general make it extremely easy to pass on not offering constructive opinions.

Some methods that take been used to annul group think in the past is selecting teams from more diverse backgrounds, and even mixing men and women for groups (Kamalnath). Groupthink tin can be considered by many to exist a detriment to companies, organizations and in whatsoever work situations. Almost positions that are senior level demand individuals to be independent in their thinking. There is a positive correlation found between outstanding executives and decisiveness (Kelman). Groupthink also prohibits an organization from moving frontward and innovating if no one ever speaks upwardly and says something could be done differently.

Antecedent factors such as group cohesiveness, faulty group construction, and situational context (e.grand., community panic) play into the likelihood of whether or not groupthink will impact the determination-making process.

History [edit]

William H. Whyte Jr. derived the term from George Orwell's Nineteen 80-Four, and popularized it in 1952 in Fortune mag:

Groupthink existence a coinage – and, admittedly, a loaded one – a working definition is in social club. We are non talking about mere instinctive conformity – it is, subsequently all, a perennial failing of mankind. What we are talking about is a rationalized conformity – an open up, articulate philosophy which holds that group values are not only expedient but right and skilful equally well.^[ix] ^[15]

Irving Janis pioneered the initial research on the groupthink theory. He does not cite Whyte, only coined the term over again by analogy with "doublethink" and like terms that were role of the newspeak vocabulary in the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell. He initially defined groupthink as follows:

I utilize the term groupthink equally a quick and piece of cake fashion to refer to the mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence-seeking becomes so ascendant in a cohesive ingroup that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action. Groupthink is a term of the same order as the words in the newspeak vocabulary George Orwell used in his dismaying globe of 1984. In that context, groupthink takes on an invidious connotation. Exactly such a connotation is intended, since the term refers to a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments as a result of grouping pressures.^[10] ^: 43

He went on to write:

The main principle of groupthink, which I offer in the spirit of Parkinson'southward Law, is this: "The more amiability and esprit de corps in that location is among the members of a policy-making ingroup, the greater the danger that contained critical thinking will exist replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing deportment directed against outgroups".^[10] ^: 44

Janis set the foundation for the written report of groupthink starting with his research in the American Soldier Project where he studied the effect of extreme stress on group cohesiveness. Later on this written report he remained interested in the ways in which people make decisions under external threats. This involvement led Janis to written report a number of "disasters" in American foreign policy, such as failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941); the Bay of Pigs Invasion fiasco (1961); and the prosecution of the Vietnam War (1964–67) by President Lyndon Johnson. He concluded that in each of these cases, the decisions occurred largely because of groupthink, which prevented contradictory views from existence expressed and subsequently evaluated.

After the publication of Janis' book Victims of Groupthink in 1972,^[11] and a revised edition with the title Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes in 1982,^[12] the concept of groupthink was used^{[ by whom? ]} to explicate many other faulty decisions in history. These events included Nazi Deutschland's decision to invade the Soviet Union in 1941, the Watergate scandal and others. Despite the popularity of the concept of groupthink, fewer than 2 dozen studies addressed the phenomenon itself following the publication of Victims of Groupthink, between the years 1972 and 1998.^[4] ^: 107 This was surprising considering how many fields of interests information technology spans, which include political science, communications, organizational studies, social psychology, management, strategy, counseling, and marketing. One can nigh likely explain this lack of follow-up in that group research is difficult to behave, groupthink has many contained and dependent variables, and it is unclear "how to translate [groupthink's] theoretical concepts into observable and quantitative constructs".^[4] ^{: 107–108}

Even so, outside research psychology and folklore, wider culture has come to detect groupthink in observable situations, for example:

" [...] critics of Twitter signal to the predominance of the hive mind in such social media, the kind of groupthink that submerges independent thinking in favor of conformity to the group, the collective"^[16]

"[...] leaders ofttimes accept beliefs which are very far from matching reality and which can become more extreme as they are encouraged by their followers. The predilection of many cult leaders for abstract, ambiguous, and therefore unchallengeable ideas can further reduce the likelihood of reality testing, while the intense milieu control exerted by cults over their members ways that almost of the reality available for testing is supplied by the group environment. This is seen in the phenomenon of 'groupthink', declared to accept occurred, notoriously, during the Bay of Pigs fiasco."^[17]

"Groupthink past Compulsion [...] [M]roupthink at least implies voluntarism. When this fails, the organization is not in a higher place outright intimidation. [...] In [a nationwide telecommunications company], refusal by the new hires to cheer on command incurred consequences non unlike the indoctrination and brainwashing techniques associated with a Soviet-era gulag."^[18]

Symptoms [edit]

To make groupthink testable, Irving Janis devised eight symptoms indicative of groupthink:^[19]

Blazon I: Overestimations of the group — its power and morality

Illusions of invulnerability creating excessive optimism and encouraging hazard taking.
Unquestioned belief in the morality of the grouping, causing members to ignore the consequences of their actions.

Type II: Closed-mindedness

Rationalizing warnings that might challenge the group'southward assumptions.
Stereotyping those who are opposed to the group equally weak, evil, biased, spiteful, impotent, or stupid.

Type 3: Pressures toward uniformity

Self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus.
Illusions of unanimity among group members, silence is viewed as agreement.
Straight force per unit area to conform placed on any member who questions the grouping, couched in terms of "disloyalty"
Mindguards— self-appointed members who shield the group from dissenting data.

Causes [edit]

Irving Janis identified three antecedent conditions to groupthink:^[11] ^: 9

high group cohesiveness: Cohesiveness is the main gene that leads to groupthink. Groups that lack cohesiveness can of grade make bad decisions, but they practice not experience groupthink. In a cohesive group, members avoid speaking out confronting decisions, avoid arguing with others, and work towards maintaining friendly relationships in the grouping. If cohesiveness gets to such a level that there are no longer disagreements between members, and then the group is ripe for groupthink.
- deindividuation: Group cohesiveness becomes more important than private freedom of expression.
- illusions of unanimity: Members perceive falsely that everyone agrees with the grouping's decision; silence is seen as consent. Janis noted that the unity of group members was mere illusion. Members may disagree with the organizations' decision, but get forth with the group for many reasons, such as maintaining their group status and avoiding conflict with managers or workmates. Such members think that suggesting opinions contrary to others may lead to isolation from the grouping.
structural faults: The group is organized in means that disrupt the communication of data, or the group carelessly makes decisions.
- insulation of the group: This can promote the evolution of unique, inaccurate perspectives on issues the group is dealing with, which can then lead to faulty solutions to the trouble.
- lack of impartial leadership: Leaders command the group discussion, by planning what will exist discussed, but allowing sure questions to be asked, and request for opinions of but certain people in the grouping. Closed-style leadership is when leaders announce their opinions on the issue before the grouping discusses the event together. Open-style leadership is when leaders withhold their opinion until a later time in the discussion. Groups with a closed-style leader are more biased in their judgments, especially when members had a high caste of certainty.
- lack of norms requiring methodological procedures
- homogeneity of members' social backgrounds and ideology
situational context:
- highly stressful external threats: High-stake decisions can create tension and anxiety; group members may cope with this stress in irrational ways. Group members may rationalize their decision past exaggerating the positive consequences and minimizing the possible negative consequences. In attempt to minimize the stressful situation, the group decides speedily and allows fiddling to no discussion or disagreement. Groups under loftier stress are more likely to make errors, lose focus of the ultimate goal, and use procedures that members know take not been constructive in the by.
- recent failures: These tin can atomic number 82 to low self-esteem, resulting in agreement with the group for fear of existence seen as wrong.
- excessive difficulties in decision-making tasks
- time pressures: Grouping members are more concerned with efficiency and quick results than with quality and accuracy. Time pressures can also lead group members to overlook of import information.
- moral dilemmas ^{[ clarification needed ]}

Although it is possible for a situation to contain all 3 of these factors, all three are non always present even when groupthink is occurring. Janis considered a loftier degree of cohesiveness to exist the most important antecedent to producing groupthink, and always present when groupthink was occurring; withal, he believed high cohesiveness would not e'er produce groupthink. A very cohesive group abides with all grouping norms; merely whether or not groupthink arises is dependent on what the group norms are. If the group encourages individual dissent and alternative strategies to problem solving, information technology is likely that groupthink will be avoided even in a highly cohesive group. This means that loftier cohesion will lead to groupthink only if one or both of the other antecedents is nowadays, situational context being slightly more probable than structural faults to produce groupthink.^[xx]

Prevention [edit]

As observed by Aldag and Fuller (1993), the groupthink miracle seems to rest on a set of unstated and mostly restrictive assumptions:^[21]

The purpose of group problem solving is mainly to amend decision quality
Group problem solving is considered a rational procedure.
Benefits of grouping trouble solving:
- diverseness of perspectives
- more information almost possible alternatives
- improve determination reliability
- dampening of biases
- social presence effects
Groupthink prevents these benefits due to structural faults and provocative situational context
Groupthink prevention methods will produce better decisions
An illusion of well-being is presumed to exist inherently dysfunctional.
Group pressures towards consensus lead to concurrence-seeking tendencies.

Information technology has been idea that groups with the potent ability to work together will be able to solve dilemmas in a quicker and more efficient way than an private. Groups take a greater amount of resources which lead them to be able to store and remember data more readily and come up with more alternative solutions to a problem. In that location was a recognized downside to group problem solving in that it takes groups more future to a decision and requires that people make compromises with each other. However, it was not until the research of Janis appeared that anyone really considered that a highly cohesive group could impair the group'south ability to generate quality decisions. Tight-knit groups may appear to make decisions better because they can come up to a consensus quickly and at a low energy cost; however, over time this procedure of decision-making may subtract the members' ability to think critically. It is, therefore, considered by many to be important to combat the effects of groupthink.^[xx]

According to Janis, decision-making groups are non necessarily destined to groupthink. He devised ways of preventing groupthink:^[eleven] ^{: 209–215}

Leaders should assign each member the function of "critical evaluator". This allows each member to freely air objections and doubts.
Leaders should not limited an stance when assigning a task to a group.
Leaders should absent themselves from many of the group meetings to avert excessively influencing the outcome.
The organization should gear up several independent groups, working on the aforementioned problem.
All effective alternatives should be examined.
Each member should discuss the grouping's ideas with trusted people exterior of the group.
The grouping should invite exterior experts into meetings. Group members should be allowed to talk over with and question the outside experts.
At least 1 group fellow member should exist assigned the role of devil's abet. This should exist a dissimilar person for each meeting.

The devil's advocate in a group may provide questions and insight which contradict the bulk group in order to avoid groupthink decisions.^[22] A written report by Ryan Hartwig confirms that the devil'south advocacy technique is very useful for group problem-solving.^[23] It allows for conflict to be used in a way that is most-constructive for finding the best solution and so that members will non have to get back and find a different solution if the first 1 fails. Hartwig also suggests that the devil'southward advocacy technique be incorporated with other grouping conclusion-making models such as the functional theory to find and evaluate alternative solutions. The main idea of the devil'southward advocacy technique is that somewhat structured conflict can be facilitated to not only reduce groupthink, but to besides solve issues.

A similar term to groupthink is the Abilene paradox, another phenomenon that is detrimental when working in groups. When organizations fall into the Abilene paradox, they take actions in contradiction to what their perceived goals may be and therefore defeat the very purposes they are trying to achieve.^[24] Failure to communicate desires or beliefs tin crusade the Abilene paradox.

As explained in the Abilene paradox, the Watergate scandal is an example of this. Before the scandal had occurred, a meeting took identify where they discussed the issue. I of Nixon's campaign aides was unsure if he should speak upward and requite his input. If he had voiced his disagreement with the group's conclusion, it is possible that the scandal could have been avoided.

Other examples of how groupthink could exist avoided or prevented:

After the Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco, President John F. Kennedy sought to avoid groupthink during the Cuban Missile Crisis using "vigilant appraisal".^[12] ^{: 148–153} During meetings, he invited outside experts to share their viewpoints, and allowed grouping members to question them carefully. He as well encouraged group members to discuss possible solutions with trusted members within their divide departments, and he fifty-fifty divided the group up into various sub-groups, to partially pause the group cohesion. Kennedy was deliberately absent-minded from the meetings, so as to avoid pressing his ain opinion.

Cass Sunstein reports that introverts tin sometimes be silent in meetings with extroverts; he recommends explicitly asking for each person'due south opinion, either during the coming together or subsequently in one-on-i sessions. Sunstein points to studies showing groups with a high level of internal socialization and happy talk are more decumbent to bad investment decisions due to groupthink, compared with groups of investors who are relative strangers and more than willing to be argumentative. To avert group polarization, where discussion with agreeing people drives an event further to an extreme than whatsoever of the individuals favored before the discussion, he recommends creating heterogeneous groups which contain people with different points of view. Sunstein also points out that people arguing a side they do not sincerely believe (in the function of devil's abet) tend to be much less effective than a sincere argument. This can be accomplished by dissenting individuals, or a group like a Red Squad that is expected to pursue an alternative strategy or goal "for real".^[25]

Empirical findings and meta-analysis [edit]

Testing groupthink in a laboratory is difficult because synthetic settings remove groups from real social situations, which ultimately changes the variables conducive or inhibitive to groupthink.^[26] Considering of its subjective nature, researchers take struggled to measure groupthink equally a consummate miracle, instead frequently opting to measure out its item factors. These factors range from causal to effectual and focus on grouping and situational aspects.^[27] ^[28]

Park (1990) institute that "only xvi empirical studies have been published on groupthink", and concluded that they "resulted in only fractional support of his [Janis's] hypotheses".^[29] ^: 230 Park concludes, "despite Janis' claim that group cohesiveness is the major necessary antecedent gene, no research has shown a significant master effect of cohesiveness on groupthink."^[29] ^: 230 Park also concludes that research on the interaction betwixt group cohesiveness and leadership style does not back up Janis' claim that cohesion and leadership style interact to produce groupthink symptoms.^[29] Park presents a summary of the results of the studies analyzed. According to Park, a study by Huseman and Drive (1979) indicates groupthink occurs in both small-scale and large determination-making groups inside businesses.^[29] This results partly from group isolation within the concern. Manz and Sims (1982) conducted a report showing that autonomous piece of work groups are susceptible to groupthink symptoms in the same fashion as decisions making groups within businesses.^[29] ^[30] Fodor and Smith (1982) produced a study revealing that group leaders with high power motivation create atmospheres more susceptible to groupthink.^[29] ^[31] Leaders with loftier power motivation possess characteristics similar to leaders with a "airtight" leadership style—an unwillingness to respect dissenting opinion. The same written report indicates that level of grouping cohesiveness is insignificant in predicting groupthink occurrence. Park summarizes a report performed by Callaway, Marriott, and Esser (1985) in which groups with highly dominant members "made higher quality decisions, exhibited lowered state of anxiety, took more time to reach a decision, and made more than statements of disagreement/understanding".^[29] ^: 232 ^[32] Overall, groups with highly dominant members expressed characteristics inhibitory to groupthink. If highly dominant members are considered equivalent to leaders with high power motivation, the results of Callaway, Marriott, and Esser contradict the results of Fodor and Smith. A report by Leana (1985) indicates the interaction between level of grouping cohesion and leadership style is completely insignificant in predicting groupthink.^[29] ^[33] This finding refutes Janis' claim that the factors of cohesion and leadership manner interact to produce groupthink. Park summarizes a report by McCauley (1989) in which structural atmospheric condition of the grouping were found to predict groupthink while situational conditions did non.^[14] ^[29] The structural weather condition included group insulation, grouping homogeneity, and promotional leadership. The situational conditions included group cohesion. These findings refute Janis' merits virtually group cohesiveness predicting groupthink.

Overall, studies on groupthink have largely focused on the factors (antecedents) that predict groupthink. Groupthink occurrence is frequently measured past number of ideas/solutions generated within a group, merely at that place is no uniform, concrete standard by which researchers can objectively conclude groupthink occurs.^[26] The studies of groupthink and groupthink antecedents reveal a mixed body of results. Some studies bespeak group cohesion and leadership style to exist powerfully predictive of groupthink, while other studies signal the insignificance of these factors. Group homogeneity and grouping insulation are generally supported every bit factors predictive of groupthink.

Case studies [edit]

Politics and military [edit]

Groupthink can accept a strong concord on political decisions and armed forces operations, which may effect in enormous wastage of human and material resources. Highly qualified and experienced politicians and military commanders sometimes make very poor decisions when in a suboptimal group setting. Scholars such as Janis and Raven attribute political and armed forces fiascoes, such every bit the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal, to the outcome of groupthink.^[12] ^[34] More recently, Dina Badie argued that groupthink was largely responsible for the shift in the U.S. administration's view on Saddam Hussein that eventually led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq past the United States.^[35] Afterward the September eleven attacks, "stress, promotional leadership, and intergroup disharmonize" were all factors that gave ascent to the occurrence of groupthink.^[35] ^: 283 Political case studies of groupthink serve to illustrate the bear upon that the occurrence of groupthink tin can take in today's political scene.

Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis [edit]

The Usa Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 1961 was the primary instance study that Janis used to codify his theory of groupthink.^[10] The invasion program was initiated by the Eisenhower administration, but when the Kennedy administration took over, information technology "uncritically accepted" the programme of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).^[10] ^: 44 When some people, such as Arthur Chiliad. Schlesinger Jr. and Senator J. William Fulbright, attempted to present their objections to the program, the Kennedy squad equally a whole ignored these objections and kept believing in the morality of their plan.^[ten] ^: 46 Somewhen Schlesinger minimized his own doubts, performing self-censorship.^[10] ^: 74 The Kennedy team stereotyped Fidel Castro and the Cubans by failing to question the CIA well-nigh its many simulated assumptions, including the ineffectiveness of Castro's air force, the weakness of Castro's army, and the inability of Castro to quell internal uprisings.^[10] ^: 46

Janis argued the fiasco that ensued could have been prevented if the Kennedy administration had followed the methods to preventing groupthink adopted during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which took identify just one year after in October 1962. In the latter crunch, essentially the same political leaders were involved in decision-making, but this time they learned from their previous mistake of seriously under-rating their opponents.^[10] ^: 76

Pearl Harbor [edit]

The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, is a prime number instance of groupthink. A number of factors such equally shared illusions and rationalizations contributed to the lack of precaution taken by U.S. Navy officers based in Hawaii. The United States had intercepted Japanese messages and they discovered that Japan was arming itself for an offensive assail somewhere in the Pacific Ocean. Washington took action past warning officers stationed at Pearl Harbor, but their alert was not taken seriously. They assumed that the Empire of Nippon was taking measures in the event that their embassies and consulates in enemy territories were usurped.

The U.S. Navy and Regular army in Pearl Harbor besides shared rationalizations about why an attack was unlikely. Some of them included:^[12] ^: 83, 85

"The Japanese would never cartel attempt a full-scale surprise assault against Hawaii because they would realize that it would precipitate an all-out war, which the Us would surely win."
"The Pacific Armada concentrated at Pearl Harbor was a major deterrent against air or naval attack."
"Even if the Japanese were foolhardy to send their carriers to attack us [the United States], we could certainly detect and destroy them in enough of time."
"No warships anchored in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor could ever exist sunk by torpedo bombs launched from enemy aircraft."

Infinite Shuttle Challenger disaster [edit]

On January 28, 1986, the U.s.a. launched the Space Shuttle Challenger. This was to be awe-inspiring for NASA, every bit a high school instructor was amidst the crew and was to be the first American civilian in space. NASA's engineering and launch teams rely on grouping work, and in order to launch the shuttle the team members must assert each organisation is operation nominally. The Thiokol engineers who designed and built the Challenger's rocket boosters warned that the temperature for the solar day of the launch could result in total failure of the vehicles and deaths of the crew.^[36] The launch resulted in disaster and grounded space shuttle flights for nearly three years.

The Challenger case was subject to a more quantitatively oriented examination of Janis's groupthink model performed by Esser and Lindoerfer, who found articulate signs of positive antecedents to groupthink in the critical decisions apropos the launch of the shuttle.^[37] The day of the launch was rushed for publicity reasons. NASA wanted to captivate and concord the attention of America. Having civilian teacher Christa McAuliffe on lath to broadcast a live lesson, and the possible mention by president Ronald Reagan in the State of the Union address, were opportunities NASA deemed critical to increasing interest in its potential noncombatant space flight program. The schedule NASA gear up out to meet was, nonetheless, cocky-imposed. It seemed incredible to many that an organization with a perceived history of successful direction would have locked itself into a schedule it had no adventure of meeting.^[38]

2016 Usa presidential election [edit]

In the weeks and months preceding the 2016 U.s.a. presidential election, in that location was near-unanimity among news media outlets and polling organizations that Hillary Clinton'south ballot was extremely likely. For example, on November 7, the day before the election, The New York Times opined that Clinton then had "a consistent and clear advantage in states worth at least 270 electoral votes."^[39] The Times estimated the probability of a Clinton win at 84%.^[40] Besides on November vii, Reuters estimated the probability of Clinton defeating Donald Trump in the election at xc%,^[41] and The Huffington Post put Clinton'southward odds of winning at 98.ii% based on "9.8 million simulations".^[42]

The contradiction between the election results and the pre-election estimates, both from news media outlets and from pollsters, may have been due to two factors: news and polling professionals could not imagine a candidate as unconventional as Trump becoming president, and Trump supporters may accept been undersampled by surveys,^[43] they or may have lied to or misled pollsters out of fear of social ostracism.^[44]

Corporate world [edit]

In the corporate world, ineffective and suboptimal group decision-making tin can negatively touch the health of a company and cause a considerable corporeality of budgetary loss.

Swissair [edit]

Aaron Hermann and Hussain Rammal illustrate the detrimental part of groupthink in the plummet of Swissair, a Swiss airline company that was idea to be so financially stable that it earned the title the "Flying Bank".^[45] The authors debate that, among other factors, Swissair carried two symptoms of groupthink: the belief that the group is invulnerable and the belief in the morality of the grouping.^[45] ^: 1056 In addition, before the fiasco, the size of the company board was reduced, subsequently eliminating industrial expertise. This may have further increased the likelihood of groupthink.^[45] ^: 1055 With the board members defective expertise in the field and having somewhat similar background, norms, and values, the pressure to conform may have get more prominent.^[45] ^: 1057 This miracle is called group homogeneity, which is an ancestor to groupthink. Together, these conditions may have contributed to the poor controlling procedure that somewhen led to Swissair's collapse.

Marks & Spencer and British Airways [edit]

Another example of groupthink from the corporate earth is illustrated in the United kingdom-based companies Marks & Spencer and British Airways. The negative impact of groupthink took place during the 1990s as both companies released globalization expansion strategies. Researcher Jack Eaton's content analysis of media press releases revealed that all eight symptoms of groupthink were present during this catamenia. The virtually predominant symptom of groupthink was the illusion of invulnerability as both companies underestimated potential failure due to years of profitability and success during challenging markets. Up until the consequence of groupthink erupted they were considered blue chips and darlings of the London Stock Exchange. During 1998–1999 the cost of Marks & Spencer shares fell from 590 to less than 300 and that of British Airways from 740 to 300. Both companies had already featured prominently in the United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland press and media for more positive reasons to do with national pride in their undoubted sector-wide functioning.^[46]

Sports [edit]

Recent literature of groupthink attempts to study the application of this concept beyond the framework of business organisation and politics. One especially relevant and popular arena in which groupthink is rarely studied is sports. The lack of literature in this area prompted Charles Koerber and Christopher Neck to begin a case-study investigation that examined the effect of groupthink on the decision of the Major League Umpires Association (MLUA) to stage a mass resignation in 1999. The decision was a failed attempt to gain a stronger negotiating stance against Major League Baseball.^[47] ^: 21 Koerber and Cervix advise that three groupthink symptoms tin exist found in the conclusion-making process of the MLUA. First, the umpires overestimated the ability that they had over the baseball league and the strength of their group'due south resolve. The union also exhibited some degree of closed-mindedness with the notion that MLB is the enemy. Lastly, there was the presence of self-censorship; some umpires who disagreed with the decision to resign failed to voice their dissent.^[47] ^: 25 These factors, along with other decision-making defects, led to a conclusion that was suboptimal and ineffective.

Kodak Photographic camera [edit]

Kodak used to be the near famous photographic camera manufacturer in the world. Its huge market share and advanced engineering at that time fabricated the company's leaders recollect they are indestructible. Nonetheless, when digital camera engineering science was developed, Kodak's leaders succumbed to the symptoms of groupthink; they refused to employ digital camera technology, believed that their picture show technology is unparalleled. This determination was ane of the principal reasons that eventually led to the collapse of their business organisation.^{[ citation needed ]}

Recent developments [edit]

Ubiquity model [edit]

Researcher Robert Baron (2005) contends that the connection betwixt certain antecedents which Janis believed necessary has not been demonstrated by the current collective trunk of research on groupthink. He believes that Janis' antecedents for groupthink are incorrect, and argues that not only are they "non necessary to provoke the symptoms of groupthink, merely that they often volition non even dilate such symptoms".^[48] As an alternative to Janis' model, Baron proposed a ubiquity model of groupthink. This model provides a revised set of antecedents for groupthink, including social identification, salient norms, and low cocky-efficacy.

General group problem-solving (GGPS) model [edit]

Aldag and Fuller (1993) contend that the groupthink concept was based on a "small and relatively restricted sample" that became as well broadly generalized.^[21] Furthermore, the concept is too rigidly staged and deterministic. Empirical support for it has also not been consistent. The authors compare groupthink model to findings presented by Maslow and Piaget; they argue that, in each case, the model incites cracking interest and further enquiry that, subsequently, invalidate the original concept. Aldag and Fuller thus propose a new model called the general group trouble-solving (GGPS) model, which integrates new findings from groupthink literature and alters aspects of groupthink itself.^[21] ^: 534 The principal divergence betwixt the GGPS model and groupthink is that the former is more value neutral and more political.^[21] ^: 544

Reexamination [edit]

Later scholars take re-assessed the merit of groupthink by reexamining case studies that Janis originally used to buttress his model. Roderick Kramer (1998) believed that, because scholars today have a more than sophisticated set of ideas about the general decision-making procedure and because new and relevant data most the fiascos have surfaced over the years, a reexamination of the case studies is appropriate and necessary.^[49] He argues that new bear witness does not support Janis' view that groupthink was largely responsible for President Kennedy'southward and President Johnson'due south decisions in the Bay of Pigs Invasion and U.S. escalated military involvement in the Vietnam War, respectively. Both presidents sought the advice of experts outside of their political groups more than Janis suggested.^[49] ^: 241 Kramer likewise argues that the presidents were the terminal decision-makers of the fiascos; while determining which course of action to take, they relied more than heavily on their own construals of the situations than on any group-consenting decision presented to them.^[49] ^: 241 Kramer concludes that Janis' caption of the two armed forces problems is flawed and that groupthink has much less influence on grouping decision-making than is popularly believed.

Groupthink, while it is thought to be avoided, does have some positive furnishings. A case study by Choi and Kim ^[50] shows that with group identity, group operation has a negative correlation with defective decision making. This study besides showed that the human relationship betwixt groupthink and defective decision making was insignificant. These findings mean that in the right circumstances, groupthink does not always have negative outcomes. It also questions the original theory of groupthink.

Reformulation [edit]

Whyte (1998) suggests that collective efficacy plays a large unrecognised office in groupthink because it causes groups to become less vigilant and to favor risks, two particular factors that narrate groups affected past groupthink.^[51] McCauley recasts aspects of groupthink's preconditions by arguing that the level of attractiveness of group members is the most prominent factor in causing poor controlling.^[52] The results of Turner's and Pratkanis' (1991) study on social identity maintenance perspective and groupthink conclude that groupthink can be viewed as a "collective effort directed at warding off potentially negative views of the group".^[vi] Together, the contributions of these scholars take brought about new understandings of groupthink that assistance reformulate Janis' original model.

Sociocognitive theory [edit]

According to a new theory many of the basic characteristics of groupthink – eastward.g., strong cohesion, indulgent atmosphere, and exclusive ethos – are the result of a special kind of mnemonic encoding (Tsoukalas, 2007). Members of tightly knit groups take a tendency to stand for pregnant aspects of their community as episodic memories and this has a anticipated influence on their grouping behavior and commonage ideology.^[53]

Run into also [edit]

Abilene paradox
Amity-enmity circuitous
Asch conformity experiments
Bandwagon effect
Collective intelligence
Collective narcissism
Democratic centralism
Dunning–Kruger outcome
Echo chamber (media)
Emotional contagion
Simulated consensus effect
Filter bubble
Grouping period
Grouping-serving bias
Groupshift
Herd behaviour
Homophily
In-group favoritism
Individualism
Lollapalooza event
Mass psychology
Moral Human and Immoral Society
No lather radio
Mob rule
Organizational dissent
Political midlife crunch
Positive psychology (relevantly, its criticism)
Preference falsification
Realistic conflict theory
Risky shift
Scapegoating
Social comparison theory
Spiral of silence
System justification
Tone policing
Iii men make a tiger
Tuckman'due south stages of group development
Vendor lock-in
Wishful thinking
Woozle effect
Team mistake

Diversity

Cultural diversity
Multiculturalism

References [edit]

^ "Leadership Glossary: Essential Terms for the 21st Century". Pick Reviews Online. 52 (11): 52–5672-52-5672. 2015-06-18. doi:x.5860/pick.190440. ISSN 0009-4978.
^ "Organisational behaviour - Docsity". www.docsity.com . Retrieved 2020-05-27 .
^ "Groupthink". Ideals Unwrapped . Retrieved 2020-05-27 .
^ ^a ^b ^c Turner, M. E.; Pratkanis, A. R. (1998). "Twenty-v years of groupthink theory and research: lessons from the evaluation of a theory" (PDF). Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 73 (2–3): 105–115. doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2756. PMID 9705798. S2CID 15074397. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-10-19.
^ Wexler, Marking North. (1995). "Expanding the groupthink caption to the study of contemporary cults". Cultic Studies Journal. 12 (1): 49–71.
^ ^a ^b Turner, Thou.; Pratkanis, A. (1998). "A social identity maintenance model of groupthink". Organizational Beliefs and Human being Determination Processes. 73 (2–three): 210–235. doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2757. PMID 9705803.
^ Sherman, Marking (March 2011), "Does liberal truly mean open-minded?", Psychology Today
^ Cain, Susan (January 13, 2012). "The rise of the new groupthink". New York Times. .
^ ^a ^b Whyte, West. H., Jr. (March 1952). "Groupthink". Fortune. pp. 114–117, 142, 146.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ Janis, I. 50. (November 1971). "Groupthink" (PDF). Psychology Today. 5 (6): 43–46, 74–76. Archived from the original on April i, 2010. {{cite periodical}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of Groupthink: a Psychological Study of Strange-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes . Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN0-395-14002-1.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^east Janis, I. L. (1982). Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes . Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN0-395-31704-5.
^ 't Hart, P. (1998). "Preventing groupthink revisited: Evaluating and reforming groups in government". Organizational Behavior and Man Decision Processes. 73 (2–three): 306–326. doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2764. PMID 9705806.
^ ^a ^b McCauley, C. (1989). "The nature of social influence in groupthink: Compliance and internalization". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 57 (2): 250–260. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.2.250.
^ Safire, William (August eight, 2004). "Groupthink". The New York Times . Retrieved February ii, 2012. If the committee's other conclusions are every bit outdated every bit its etymology, we're all in trouble. 'Groupthink' (i word, no hyphen) was the title of an article in Fortune magazine in March 1952 by William H. Whyte Jr. ... Whyte derided the notion he argued was held by a trained elite of Washington'due south 'social engineers.'
^ Cantankerous, Mary (2011-06-thirty). Bloggerati, Twitterati: How Blogs and Twitter are Transforming Popular Culture. ABC-CLIO (published 2011). p. 62. ISBN9780313384844 . Retrieved 2013-11-17 . [...] critics of twitter bespeak to the predominance of the hive mind in such social media, the kind of groupthink that submerges independent thinking in favor of conformity to the group, the collective.
^ Taylor, Kathleen (2006-07-27). Brainwashing: The Science of Idea Command. Oxford University Press (published 2006). p. 42. ISBN9780199204786 . Retrieved 2013-11-17 . [...] leaders often have beliefs which are very far from matching reality and which can become more farthermost as they are encouraged by their followers. The predilection of many cult leaders for abstract, ambiguous, and therefore unchallengeable ideas can farther reduce the likelihood of reality testing, while the intense milieu control exerted by cults over their members means that well-nigh of the reality available for testing is supplied by the group environment. This is seen in the phenomenon of 'groupthink', alleged to have occurred, notoriously, during the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
^ Jonathan I., Klein (2000). Corporate Failure by Design: Why Organizations are Congenital to Neglect. Greenwood Publishing Grouping. p. 145. ISBN9781567202977 . Retrieved 2013-11-17 . Groupthink by Compulsion [...] [G]roupthink at least implies voluntarism. When this fails, the organization is not in a higher place outright intimidation. [...] In [a nationwide telecommunications company], refusal by the new hires to cheer on control incurred consequences not unlike the indoctrination and brainwashing techniques associated with a Soviet-era gulag.
^ Cook M., The Theory of Groupthink Applied to Nanking, Stanford University, accessed 12 Dec 2020
^ ^a ^b Hart, Paul't (1991). "Irving L. Janis' "Victims of Groupthink"". Political Psychology. 12 (2): 247–278. doi:10.2307/3791464. JSTOR 3791464. S2CID 16128437.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Aldag, R. J.; Fuller, S. R. (1993). "Beyond fiasco: A reappraisal of the groupthink phenomenon and a new model of group decision processes" (PDF). Psychological Message. 113 (3): 533–552. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.113.iii.533. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-06-18.
^ Aamodt, G. 1000. (2016). Group behavior, terms, and conflict. Industrial/organizational psychology: An practical approach (8th ed.). Boston, MA: Cengage Learning.
^ Hartwig, R. (2007), Facilitating problem solving: A case report using the devil's advancement technique, Briefing Papers - National Communication Association, published in Group Facilitation: A Research and Applications Journal, Number 10, 2010, pp 17-32, accessed two Nov 2021
^ Harvey, Jerry B. (1974). "The abilene paradox: The management of understanding". Organizational Dynamics. 3 (1): 63–fourscore. doi:10.1016/0090-2616(74)90005-ix. ISSN 0090-2616.
^ "Gauging Group Dynamics". January 21, 2015.
^ ^a ^b Flowers, M.L. (1977). "A laboratory examination of some implications of Janis'southward groupthink hypothesis". Periodical of Personality and Social Psychology. 35 (12): 888–896. doi:x.1037/0022-3514.35.12.888.
^ Schafer, M.; Crichlow, S. (1996). "Antecedents of groupthink: a quantitative written report". Journal of Conflict Resolution. forty (3): 415–435. doi:x.1177/0022002796040003002. S2CID 146163100.
^ Cline, R. J. W. (1990). "Detecting groupthink: Methods for observing the illusion of unanimity". Communication Quarterly. 38 (two): 112–126. doi:10.1080/01463379009369748.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ Park, W.-W. (1990). "A review of research on groupthink" (PDF). Journal of Behavioral Determination Making. 3 (4): 229–245. doi:10.1002/bdm.3960030402. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-04-09.
^ Manz, C. C.; Sims, H. P. (1982). "The potential for "groupthink" in autonomous work groups". Homo Relations. 35 (9): 773–784. doi:10.1177/001872678203500906. S2CID 145529591.
^ Fodor, Eugene Grand.; Smith, Terry, Jan 1982, The power motive as an influence on grouping conclusion making, Periodical of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 42(1), 178–185. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.178
^ Callaway, Michael R.; Marriott, Richard Chiliad.; Esser, James One thousand., Oct 1985, Effects of authorisation on group decision making: Toward a stress-reduction caption of groupthink, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 49(iv), 949–952. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.49.4.949
^ Carrie, R. Leana (1985). A partial examination of Janis' Groupthink Model: Effects of group cohesiveness and leader behavior on defective conclusion making, "Journal of Management", vol. 11(i), v–eighteen. doi: 10.1177/014920638501100102
^ Raven, B. H. (1998). "Groupthink: Bay of Pigs and Watergate reconsidered". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 73 (2/3): 352–361. doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2766. PMID 9705808.
^ ^a ^b Badie, D. (2010). "Groupthink, Republic of iraq, and the State of war on Terror: Explaining US policy shift toward Iraq". Foreign Policy Analysis. half-dozen (4): 277–296. doi:x.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00113.x. S2CID 18013781.
^ "CW Communications: Comparison of AM and FMD. Middleton, Introduction to Statistical Advice Theory, McGrawHill Book Company, New York, 1960 and, J. L. Lawson and K. East. Uhlenbeck, Threshold Signals, McGrawHill Volume Company, New York, 1950, contain extensive discussions of both AM and FM.", Advice Systems and Techniques, IEEE, 2009, doi:10.1109/9780470565292.ch3, ISBN978-0-470-56529-ii
^ Hart, Paul't (June 1991). "Irving Fifty. Janis' Victims of Groupthink". Political Psychology. 12 (2): 247–278. doi:10.2307/3791464. ISSN 0162-895X. JSTOR 3791464.
^ "Recovery afterward Challenger", Infinite Shuttle Columbia, Springer Praxis Books in Space Exploration, Praxis, 2005, pp. 99–146, doi:10.1007/978-0-387-73972-4_3, ISBN978-0-387-21517-4
^ "Clinton has solid pb in Electoral College". New York Times. November 7, 2016. Archived from the original on Nov vii, 2016. {{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL condition unknown (link)
^ "Who will be President? Hillary Clinton has an 84% run a risk to win". New York Times. November 7, 2016. Archived from the original on Nov vii, 2016. {{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
^ "Clinton Has xc% chance of winning". Reuters/Ipsos State of the Nation Project. November 7, 2016. Archived from the original on November viii, 2016. {{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
^ "Election 2016 forecast". Huffington Post. Nov 7, 2016. Archived from the original on Nov seven, 2016. {{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
^ "How did anybody get it then wrong?". Politician. Nov ix, 2016. Archived from the original on Nov 9, 2016. Retrieved November 9, 2016.
^ Wilcox, Clifton (2010). Groupthink: an impediment to success. Xlibris Corp., Bloomington, IN. ISBN 1450046142
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Hermann, A.; Rammal, H. G. (2010). "The grounding of the "flying bank"". Management Determination. 48 (7): 1051. doi:10.1108/00251741011068761.
^ Eaton, Jack (2001). "Direction communication: the threat of groupthink". Corporate Communications. half-dozen (four): 183–192. doi:10.1108/13563280110409791.
^ ^a ^b Koerber, C. P.; Neck, C. P. (2003). "Groupthink and sports: An application of Whyte'south model". International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management. 15: 20–28. doi:10.1108/09596110310458954.
^ Baron, R. (2005). "So correct it'southward wrong: Groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group determination making". Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. 37: 35. doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(05)37004-3. ISBN9780120152377.
^ ^a ^b ^c Kramer, R. M. (1998). "Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later on: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time?". Organizational Beliefs and Human Determination Processes. 73 (2/3): 236–71. doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2762. PMID 9705804.
^ Choi, J. N., & Kim, Thou. U. (1999). The organisation application of groupthink and its limitations in organizations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(ii), 297-306.
^ Whyte, G. (1998). "Recasting Janis's Groupthink model: The key role of commonage efficacy in conclusion fiascoes". Organizational Behavior and Human being Decision Processes. 73 (2/3): 185–209. doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2761. PMID 9705802.
^ McCauley, C. (1998). "Group dynamics in Janis's theory of groupthink: Backward and forrard". Organizational Behavior and Human Conclusion Processes. 73 (2/iii): 142–162. doi:x.1006/obhd.1998.2759. PMID 9705800.
^ Tsoukalas, I. (2007). "Exploring the microfoundations of group consciousness". Culture and Psychology. 13 (1): 39–81. doi:10.1177/1354067x07073650. S2CID 144625304.